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One goal of communication research has been to isolate 
variables which ·can account for individual diffe~ences in 
the acceptance or rejection of persuasive communications. 
·The self-esteem or favorableness of self-rating of the 
recipient is one such variable. 
The purpose of this investigation 1s to determine the 
relationship between resistance to persuasion and generalized 
self-esteem. Resistance is studied as a function of ~re---
treatments which, when administered to a receiver, render 
..,/\ 
him less susceptible to ,persuasive mess~ge~ than he is 
found to be without these pretreatments. A cursory review 
of contemporary literature in this area might lead one to 
believe that the relationship has already been · formulated. 
Cox and Bauer (1964) tell us, "A well established finding 
in the literature on personality and persuasibility is that 
males low in self-esteem, or generalized self-confidence, 
are on the whole more readily persuaded than males high in 
self-confidence." Or to put it . in another way; males with 
high self-esteem are more resistant to persuasive attempts 
than males with low self-esteem. 
It should be made clear that while the current investi-
gation involves "resistance" to -persuasion, the vast majority 
of related work in this area refers to "persuasibility." 
Unlike the resistance research paragigm, persuasibility 
research usually does not involve messages which are 
designed to protect beliefs. 
~anis (1954, 1955), Janis and Field (1959), and Janis 
and Rife (1959) hypothesized that self-esteem would cor-
r--_ 
relate negatively with persuasibility , in young adults. 
The ir rationale was that compliance is a defensive attempt 
t o avoid displeasing anydne. The composite results of the 
four studies offer somewhat weak and dubious support for 
the ir hypothesis. This is so because (1) the trends are 
s mall and usually insignificant; (2) the studies are 
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p r a ctically impossible to compare dire~tly, due to variations 
in me thods and types . of subjects; and (3) 1n any des~gn 
correlati~g a contemporary characteristic of a subject with 
a "consequent" behavior, there is much danger of artifa.ctual 
con tamination between the two measures being correlated 
(Wylie, 1961). 
For example, 1n two of the four studies (Janis, 1954; 
Janis and Field, 1959), self-esteem was measured by a 
sp e cially assembled collection of personality ·questionnaire 
items which the experimenter subdivided by inspection into 
three clusters. It appears that the two studies did not 
employ the same criterion to establish levels of self-
esteem. Self-esteem was inferred by Janis (1954) from 38 
items selected from "standard inventories" classed on the 
3 
basis of manifest content into (a) ~ocial inadequacy, 
(b) inhibit~on of aggression, (c) depression, (~) neurotic 
-~ . 
anxiety, (3) obsessional symptoms. Janis (1954) used the 
first three clusters to measure self-esteem. Janis and 
Field (1959) published three apparently different clusters: 
(a) social inadequacy, (b) so.cial inhibition, (c) test 
anxiety. Still, Wylie (1961) reported that the estimated 
coefficient of reliability, using the Spearman-Brown 
formula, for these clusters ra~ged from +.65 to +.91. In 
a third study (Janis and Rife, 1959), only one of the Janis 
and Field clusters was used (social inadequacy) as the 
self-esteem measure. In the fourth study (Janis, 1955) a , 
socially oriented "anxiety" cluster from Sarason's Test 
Anxiety Questionnaire. was the self-esteem index. 
Also, three different measures of persuasibility were 
used in the four studies. Janis and Rife (1959) used a 
persu~sibility test developed in part by Janis and Fie~d. 
Janis and Field (1959) used what they termed a "new" 
persuasibility te$t developed by themselves. And, Janis 
(1954~ measured persuasibility using three questions 
originally developed by Hovland and Weiss (1951). 
The Janis (1954) study supports the hypothesis that 
high self-esteem ·subjects were significantly less persuas-
ible than low self-esteem subjects for two out of three 
clusters of the self-esteem index. Persuasibility was 
found to be p ositively correlated with the "neurotic 
anxiety" and " obsess ional symptoms•• self-esteem clusters. 
Subsequent evidence (Janis, 1955) failed to confirm the 
inverse relation between persuasibility and self-esteem. 
I ·~ . 
In the Janis and Field (1959) study, only two out of six 
measures of validity reached acceptable levels of s1gn1-
ficance. Their results showed significant coTrelations 
between persuasibility and the self-esteem clusters of 
"social inadequacy" and "social inhibitions." The only 
highly significant corre~ation was obtained by Janis and 
Rife (1959) between one of the Janis and Field self-esteem 
clusters (social inadequacy) and a persuasibility test 
given to hospitalized, emotionally disturbed males. 
However, a substantial difference was found between means 
of normal and abnormal groups. The difference approached 
significance beyond tbe 10 per cent confidence level 
( = 1.81; p <.08, two-tail). It would appear unrealistic 
to generalize to other populations from this sample. , 
Even if all the correlations had come from compa~able 
procedures and had been highly signifi~ant, a problem of 
interpretation would remain. This problem lies in the 
I 
possible confounding · between persuasibility and initial 
opinion. That is, if groups classed as high; medium, and 
low on persuasibility also differed systematically on 
their initial opinions, one could not tell whether self-
4. 
esteem was associated with initial opinions, persuasibility, 
I 
or both. Apparently the correlation of initial opinion 
with opinion change was not explored 1n any of these 
5 . 
studies. Related to this question, however, Janis reported 
in his 1954 article that he examined the precommunication 
·~ 
opinions of the personality groups. He says (1954) "No 
signific~nt or ~Qnsistent diffe~ences were found which could 
account for the observed differen.~es in. opinion change ,. 
(p. 514) ." A similar control observation was not reported 
in the other three studi~s . . In criticizing his other study 
(Janis and Field, 1959) the author reports that "it is 
measuring something quite different from what is measured 
by t h e self-ratings, but there is only one significant 
correl~tion, which is not a very large one, while the others 
are too small to approach statistical significance. Per-
haps the main reason for the low correlations is that the 
self-rati~g scores have low .reliability (p. 257)." 
Abelson and Lesser (1959) proposed that self-esteem 
1n children is n~gatively associated with persuasibility. 
Self-esteem was measured in three ways: (1) Children were 
f 
asked to compare themselves with the other children in the 
class on certain favorable but amb~guous charact~ristics; 
' . 
(2) Each subject ~ai asked which children in his class 
liked him and woul~ choose to sit next to him; (3) Finally, 
the discrepancy between the rank of the second measure and 
... . 
the child's actual so~iome~ric rank was obtained. It is 
not clear why the third Lindex should be called a "self-
• esteem" measu-re, since it involves mo're than the subject's 
6 
self-report. In a later study, the authors deleted this 
"third" measure of self-esteem. 
In contrast to the ·studies mentioned above, persuasi-
bility was not measured in terms of before and after change 
scores. The specially devised Persuasibility Booklet . 
contained pairs of pictures of unfamiliar objects. It was 
assumed that the subjects' attitude toward eith~r p~cture 
in a pair would be neutral unless influenced by someone 
else's expressed opinion. · By avoiding before and after 
measures, the authors hoped to avoid the "initial opinion 
artifact'' (Wylie, ~961). 
The teacher or experimenter indicated which picture 
she liked better ln each pair and then she asked the 
subjects to indicate their choice. Persuasibility was 
measured ln terms of the -number of·agreements between 
child and communicator. 
Eleven groups of first-grade subjects were used, and 
since there were three self-esteem indices, 33 measures of 
validity were . obtained between self-esteem and persuasl-
bility scores. Twenty-two of these measures of validity 
were in the predicted direc~ion, but none were significant. 
When groups were separated by sex, only the third measure 
of self-esteem prQvided significant support for the 
hypothesis. Again, this is the . measure which was deleted 
in subsequent studies, apparently due to a lack of face 
validity. 
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In a second study by these authors, children were 
designated as high or low in self-esteem on the basis of 
~ 
a combination of the first and second self-esteem measures. 
The experimenter first elicited an individual child's pre-
ferences on piii~ of ·pictures, then agreed or disagreed wit4 
th e child's selection. Next, . she attempted to influence 
t h e children on fourteen pictures by presenting her own 
op inion before the child expressed his. Children with low 
s elf -esteem were signi f icantly more persuasible on the final 
f ou r teen pictures than were children with h~gh self-esteem. 
Significant results were obtaineq in each of two replicat~ons. 
Thi s was a significant interaction effect, since. it was 
only after experimenter agreement in the initial part of 
the procedure that the · subjects with low self-esteem scores 
exhib i t ed greater persuas~bility on the final fourteen 
p ictures. The ~ authors speculate that the low self-esteem 
chi ld reacts sensitively to the approval he seeks from 
others and is predisposed to be persuasible only if the 
communicator indicates to him the likely possibility ·that 
they will agree with .each other. 
Only in the second study did these investiga-tors 
obtain support for the prediction that self-esteem is 
negatively related to persuasibility in first-grade 
children. Why null results were obtained from the first 
·' 
two measures in their first des~gn is difficult to ascertain. 
It may be that the relation between self-esteem and 
persuasibility 1s not obtained unless th~ experimenter has 
indicated that the reward of agreement with him is a 
~ 
possibility. 
Cohen (1959) concluded that within interacting pa1rs 
8 
of persons, subjects who are high in self-esteem will exert 
more influence on a common judgment and/or will perceive 
themselves as attempting to influence the partner more often 
than will subjects low in self-esteem. However, it must be 
noted that Cohen's conclusion is more speculative than 
empirically supported. In fact, the experiment was 
originally designed for another purpose, that of measuring 
attitude change of subjects in relation to similar and 
dissimilar source characteristics. Self-esteem was employed 
only as a control variable for the similar~ty manipu+ation. 
Janis, Field, Rife, Abelson, and Lesser all assumed 
that subjects with low self-esteem are persuasible because 
they have an especially strong need to avoid displeasi~g 
others. 
Linton and Graham's (1959) study is more complicated 
than any of the above investigations because they utilized 
more measures of personality, includi~g some which pur-
ported to index both the conscious and unconscious self 
lmages of the subjects. Persuasibility was measured on 
two questions 1n an opinion-change test; On the basis of 
this test, subjects were subdiyided into three unequal 
size groups: those who changed toward the opiriions 
9 
expressed 1n the persuasive communication (positive changers), 
those who changed away from the persuasive communication 
(negative . changers), and nonchangers. There was no control 
group to establish what changes would occur without sys-
tematic intervening influence, nor.to provide a basis for 
establishing the cutting points between what might be called 
nonsignificant change (i.e., nonchange) and significant 
change (i.e., change in either a positive or negative 
direction). The n~gative · change . group was cut much nearer 
the 0% change point than was the positive change group. 
' This decision was apparently made p.artly on the basis of a 
preliminary analysis of the relation between independent 
and dependent variables (Wylie, 1961). We cannot know 
whether the change g~oups were match~d as to their original 
answers, but this seems unlikely. If they were not matched 
on original answers, .this . leaves the possibility that the 
personality variables might be associated with the position 
of the subjects' original answers to the opinion items, 
rather than being associated with the subjects' changeability 
of oplnlon. Thus, there would be a distinct possibility 
of internal invalidity due to statistica~ regression. 
On the personality measurement side of the study, th~ 
authors assumed the validity of certain Machovei f~gure 
drawing scales for revealing the subjects' unconscious 
self image. This assumption has been challenged on the 
basis of extensive literature reviews by Levy (1950) and 
by Swensen (1957). Twe:lve out of the 38 figure drawing 
10 
compar1sons significantly differentiated,positive changers 
from the other two groups. But in the light of the unproven 
~ 
validity of the test, as well as the questions already 
raised about the formation of the groups, one wonders how 
to interpret these statistical findings. 
In summary, before it ii concluded that a generalized 
relationship between "self-est·eem" and "persuasibili ty" has 
b e en demonstrated, we mu~t remember the following facts 
about the related studies~ (1) Conclusions and significant 
results are inconsistent. (2) Every study used a different 
combination of self-esteem and persuasibility measures. 
Intercorrelation arno~g self-esteem measures between studies 
has not been sufficiently demonstrated. No intercorrelations 
among persuasibility or conformity measures are available. 
We should avoid generalizations based on assigning the 
same label to several possibly unrelated instruments. In 
short, one cannot combine the findi~gs from the several 
studies into a pattern which has a clear meaning. (3) Many 
ins~gnificant trends were obtained> includi~g insignificant 
reversals from p~edicted associations. (4) The possibility 
of artifact has not been ruled out in all studies. In 
particular the "initial opinion" has not been adequately 
controlled for in the opinion change studies (Wylie, 1961). 
Since previous findings are inconsistent, it is not 
possible to derive a formal hypothesis for the current 
study. While this study deals with persuasibility and 
self-esteem, it deals so in a more specific way than that 
11 . 
of previous research in that resistance to persuas1on, 
rather than persuasibility, is the d~~endent measure. Con-
£erring resistance to persuasion as considered here involves 
giving a person some specific training (communication) that 
would enhan·ce his ability to adhere to hi$ belief when 
subsequently confronted with influence {persuasive) attempts 
(McGuire, 19 6 4) . 
McGuire's series of experiments on inducing 
resistance to persua·sion stems from .a biological 
analogy, whence the term "inoculation theory." In 
the biological situation, the person is typically 
made resistant to some attacking virus by pre-
exposure to a weakened dose of the virus. This 
mild dose stimulates his defenses so that he will be 
better able to overcome any massive viral attack to 
which he is later expo~ed, but is not so ~trong 
that this pre-exposure w~ll itself cause the 
disease. Alternatively, biological resistance can 
be augmented by supportive therapy such as adequate 
rest, good diet, and vitamin supplements. Inoculation 
is likely to be superior to supportive therapy to 
the extent that the person has previously been 
brought up in a germ-free environment. It is a 
seeming paradox that individuals taised aseptically 
tend to appear vigorously healthy (even without 
supportive therapy) but are highly vulnerable when 
suddenly exposed to massive doses of the disease 
virus (McGuire, 1964, p. 200). 
McGuire theorized that to directly apply his biol~gical 
analogy, he should "deal as far as possible with beliefs 
that had been maintained 1n a 'germ-free' ideological 
environment, that is, beliefs that the person has seldom, 
if ever, heard attacked (1964, p. 200)." He therefore used 
only "cultural truisms," strongly held beliefs about health 
practices, as issues in his experiments. 
McGuire's inoculation theory assumes that pretreatments 
des~gned to make beliefs resistant to subsequent persuasive 
12 
attacks will be effective to the extent that they overcome 
two basic difficulties: one, the b~}iever is unpracticed 
in defending his belief; and two, he is unmotivated to 
undertake the necessary practice because he conside~s the 
belief unassailable. McGuire hypothesized that motivation 
to defend belief in a truism · could be effected by causing 
a listener to perceive his belief as vulnerable, and that 
such a perception could be accomplished through pre-exposure 
to weakened forms of subsequent counterarguments. Further, 
motivation alone was not expected t~ supply resistance 
since an individual may not have available any defensive 
material with which to refute an attack. Thus, some 
amount of guidance is needed to aid in the development of 
such belief-bolstering material (McGuire, 1964). McGuire's 
(1964) study showed that -defenses which present arguments 
supporting the belief are less effective in conferring 
resistance to subsequent strong attack than are refuta-
tional-same defenses. The latter ignore arguments positively 
supporting the belief but do mention and refute the same 
arguments against the belief as are to be used in the sub-
sequent attack. He also found that a refutational defense 
is almost as effective when it refutes arguments against 
the belief which are different from those to be used in 
the later attack as when it refutes the very same arguments 
used in the attack. 
Only three studies that involve resistance to persuas1on 
as a function of self-esteem are available. All three of 
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these (Kelman, 1950; Mausner, 1954; Samelson, 1957) attempt 
to experimentally manipulate self-esteem, rath~r than 
investigate generalized self-esteem's relationship to res1s-
tance to persuasion. These researchers demonstrated that 
a prior success ~xperience enhances the believer's resistance 
to subsequent persuasive attempts. Resistance was increased, 
even when the task on which the individual succeeded was 
quite· different from the . task employed in the influence 
attempt. The current study does not at~empt to manipulate 
self-esteem. ~ purpose of this study is to determine the 
relationship between resistance to peisuasion and generalized 
self-esteem. 
Cox and Bauer's. (1964) statement, "a 1iell established 
findin~," concerning this relationship receives only 
sporadic s~pport. Sine~ Prev~ous research is lnconsistent, 
the following research questions will be examined in order 
to evaluate this phenomena: 
1. What i~ .the relationship betw~en resistance to 
persuasion and _ieneral self-e~t~~m? 
2. What type of defense is best · suited for lo~· · self­
esteem individuals· to accomplish resistance to 
persuasion for moderately he~d beliefs? 
3. What type of defense is best suited for high self-
esteem individuals for moderately held beliefs? 
4. Of supportive, refutation-same, and refutation-
different, wh.ich defense is the best suited for 
all subjects combined for moderately held beliefs? 
In order to examine these questions, an experimental 
group (3 x 2 design) and a control group (2 x 2) was employed 
The experimental group was divided into high self-esteem 
and low self-esteem with subjects r~domly receiving one 
of the three defenses:· · refutational-same, refutational-
different or s~pportive. The control group, also divided 
into high and low self-~steem, received an attack-only 





Approximately 200 male Army reserve members, including 
officers and enlisted men, were used as subjects. These 
men were servi~g a two week traini~g period at Fort Stewart, 
Georgia. Subjects were seen in three separate . groups, 
varying in size from fifty to eighty subjects per group. 
These subjects were made available as students for a 
weekly training session. 
Subjects' ~ges ranged from 18 to 47. It is also 
interesting to note that occupations ranged from Chemists 
and H~gh School Principals to common labor. The reserve 
rank of subjects ranged from Private to Colonel. A cross 
section of race, education, and. ge~graphical habitat was 
noted for all groups. 
Independent control groups were used to obtain initial 
mean belief levels and · to exam1ne the effects of the 
belief-attacking messages without the belief-defending 
messages on initial belief levels. Individual subjects 
were exposed to only one type ' of defense: supportive, 
refutational-same, or· refutational-different. 
De·s ·ign 
There were a total of ten conditions; s1x (3 x 2) of 




and four.(2 x 2) of which represented the control conditions 
(see Table 2) . 
TABLE 1 
Proposed/Actual Distribution and 
Division·- of Expe.rimental Cells and Subjects 

















Proposed/Actual Distribution and 












Due to randomiza~ion of treatments, the actual dis-
tribution did not replicate the proposed~number of subjects 
per cell. This difference is also due to division . of all 
subjects by using a median split £or all self-esteem scores . 
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The design provided final opinion scores for each of 
the five message treatments: supportive, refutational-
same> refutational-different, attack only,' and the neither 
defense/nor attack condition. The experiment covered two 
sessions, the first devoted to the defenses; the second, to 
strong attacks and to measuring the resultant belief 
levels. The present study was presented to subjects as 
a verbal skills test. 
Two basic types of defenses were used which differ 1n 
the amount of threat: "supportive" and "refutational." 
The supportive defense was non-threatening; it .consisted 
of giving the subject various a!guments in support of the 
mod~rately held belief. The refutational defense was more 
threatening; instead of positively supporti~g the belief, 
it mentioned several arguments attacking the belief, and 
then proceeded to refute those attacks. 
The refutational defenses, considered 1n relation to 
the subsequent attacks, were one of two types. They 
either mentioned and refuted the very arguments against 
the belief that were · used in the subsequent attack, or 
they mentioned and refuted arguments different from the 
ones used in the attacks. McGuire (1964) tells us that 
"this. refutational-same vs. refutational-different defense 
variation is useful in determining whether any increased 
resistance to persuasion derives from the . generalized 
motivational effect of the threatening mention of the 
18 
arguments against the belief, or whether it stems from the 
useful defensive material provided directly by the 
refutations (p. 202)." 
· ·Ma teri'a1s 
· Issues. Two issues (relevant-non-relevant) were 
selected on the basis of a previous study (Pryor, 1972). 
The topics selected were the followi~g: "Vehicular Defects: 
A Frequent Cause of Traffic Accidents" and "The Benefits 
of Brushing Teeth after Every Meal," the latter being used 
as non-relevant filler material. 
Messages. The experimental messages for all defensive 
and attacking treatments replicated the McGuire format. 
Two types of messages were used, includi~g those des~gned 
to defend and those des~gned to attack an existing belief. 
The former, which McGuire (1964) calls immunizing messages, 
consists of three paragraphs. The first paragraph mentions 
two "misleading" counterarguments against the belief, 
while the second and third contain the refutations of these 
two countera:rguments . . To create refutational-same and 
refutational-different defenses, two immunizing messages 
were prepared on each belief. That is, the attacking 
messages used either the same or different arguments than 
those previously refuted in the defensive treatment. As 
in McGuire's work, the supportive defenses consisted of 
a statement about an issue, followed first by a paragraph 
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containing two supportive arguments, then by two paragraphs, 
each developing one of the arguments. 
The attacking messages were des~gned to reduce belief 
levels through strong arguments against a belief. Similar 
in structure to the immunizing messages, each contained 
three paragraphs, the first of which briefly described two 
attacks against the belief, while the followi~g two para-
graphs strongly elabor~t~d those counterarguments with 
specific evidence for theiT validity. All the mess~ges, 
both immunizing and strong counterarguing, were between 
500 and 550 words in le~gth (see Appendix D). 
Measurement Scales. A person's self-esteem affects 
the evaluation he places on ~is performance in a particular 
situation and the manner 1n which he behaves when in inter-
.action with others. Self~esteem concerns the amount of 
value an individual attributes to various facets of his . . 
person and may be said to be affected by the success and 
fail ures he has experienced in satisfying central needs. 
It may be viewed as a function of the coincidence between 
an individual's aspirations and his achievement of these 
aspirations. Therefore, the instrument for measur1ng 
self-esteem was des~gned in accordance with this definition. 
Self-esteem was operationally defined by Rosenbe!g's 
modification of the Tennessee Self Concept Scale, which 
measures three aspects of the self concept: identity, 
acceptance, and behavior. Since it is more specific to 
current purposes, only one of the above clusters, self-
acceptance, was used. As Rosenberg (1965·) explains, one 
connotation of high self-esteem is that a subject thinks 
that he is "good---e-nough .. " This concept lS reflected in 
Rosenberg's modified scale for use in this study (see 
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Appendix A). Subjects were divided into high and low self-
esteem group~ by using a median split. 
Resis·tan·ce ·to· ·Persuasion Measurem·ent. Initial op1n1ons 
on moderately held beliefs (Pryor, 1972) were defined 
using McGuire's (1964) fifteen point scale. Persuasion 
was said to have occurred when an attacking message pro-
duced a significant decrease in mean belief level on the 
15-point scale. Operationally, resistance to persuasion 
occurred when a defense-attack experimental treatment 
produced a mean belief level significantly higher than 
its corresponding attack-only treatment. Each question-
naire contained seven questions of which four were relevant 
and thr~e were non-relevant (see Appendix B). A subject's 
score on a given topic was the mean of his responses to 
the four relevant items. For example: 
Only a small number of traffic accidents 1n the U. S. are 
attributable to vehicle failures. 
/ ·1 I 2 I ·3 I '4 I ·5· I ·6 I ·7 I 8 I 9 I 
Def1n1tely Probably Uncerta1n 
False False 




Administration. To minimize suspicion concern1ng the 
self-concept and attitude measures the sessions were listed 
on a weekly training schedule as "S-2" (intelligence) and 
counter-intelligence operations. 
In each experimental session, the instructions on the 
cover page of each test booklet were read aloud. Subjects 
were told that the "essays have been prepared by a research 
team at the Institute for . Social Research and are designed 
to test reading skills.'' ·subjects in ail sessions were 
instructed to read each par~graph, then go back and under-
line its crucial clause. Five minutes were allotted to the 
completion of each essay, three minutes for the 12-item 
attitude questionnaire. The' same instructions were repeated 
at the beginning of the follow-up sessions in delayed 
measure treatments . 
. Subjects were told that all answers they gave would be 
held in strict confidence, and that there would be no way 
for their answers to be traced back to them. 
Each subject received one· of five different booklets 
on random basis. The different types of booklets are 
diagramed as follows: 
Type I: (Neither/Nor) I Cover I Self-Esteem 
Questionnaire I Filler Questionnaire I 
Filler Material I Filler Material I 
Relevant Questionnaire. 
Type II: · (Attack Only) Cover I Self-Esteem Question- . 
naire I Filler Questionnaire / Filler Material I 
Relevant Attack I Relevant Questionnaire. 
Type III: ( Refu t ational-Same) Cover I Self-Esteem 
Questionnaire I Filler Questionnaire I 
Refutational-Same Defense I Relevant 
Attack I Relevant Questionnaire. 
Type IV: (Refutational-Different) Cover I Self-
Esteem Questionnaire / · Filler Question-
- ·rraire I Refutational-Different Defense ' I 
Relevant Attack I Reievant Question~aire . ., . 
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Type . V: (Suppor~i .. ve) ·coyer I ~elf-Esteem Ques.tion-. 
naire I ~=-Filler Quest~onnaire I Supportive ' 
Defense \ j Re;lev-ant Attack~ I Relevant ·-· 
Questionnaire. 
After the subjects had finished all sections and the 
booklets were collected, a general debriefing and question-
an swer period was held. The subjects were again assured 
th at all answers they gave would .be held in confidence. 
Subjects were di yided into h~gh and low ·self-esteem 
gr oups by using a median split of their mean scores on the 
s elf -este em test. Scores on the self-esteem test were 
computed by adding the twenty separate indicators and 
dividing by twenty to achieve an average score for each 
subject. 
Final belief levels were computed by obtaining the 
mean of an individual's responses on the 15 point scales. 
A 3 x 2 factorial analysis of variance was used to measure 
the main and interaction effects of types of defenses and 
levels of self-esteem (see Table 1). A 2 x 2 factorial 
analysis was used for the control measurements (see Table 2). 
In all cases, follow-up t tests were used to isolate 
simple effects when warranted by analysis of variance results. 
., .. 
Results 
The mean belief levels produced by each treatment in 
relation to self-esteem scores form the data of this study. 
Belief levels were defined as ·a subject's score along the 
15-point continuum. P~rsuasion may b~ said to have occurred 
when an attacking message produced a significant decrease 
in mean belief level on the 15-point scale.· Operationally, 
resistance to persuasion occurred when a defense-attack 
experimental treatment produced a mean belief level signi-
ficantly higher than its corresponding attack-only treatment. 
A subject's score was computed as the mean of his responses 
to the four relevant items. The questionnaire may be 
examined in Appendix B. Mean belief levels for each 
treatment are summarized 1n Table 3. 
TABLE 3 
Mean Belief Levels Produced by All Treatments 






Subjects with High Subjects it 









*Indicates number of subjects per ce 
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Table 3 shows that the mean belief level in the low self-
esteem condition was 6.92 with no attack and no defense 
(neither/nor) and 3.90 with an attack-only. For the high 
self-esteem co!l~_i_tion the . _ g~oup mean for neither/nor was 
8.20 and 3.36 for attack-only. 
Self-esteem levels are defined as a subject's mean 
score of 20 items along a 7-point continuum. The question-
nalre may be found i~ App~ndix A. Mean self-esteem scores 
ranged from 7.00 (High) to 3.10 (Low). The median split 
for all (200) self-esteem scores occurred at 5.70. Mean 
self-esteem scores for each cell are reflected in Table 4. 
TABLE 4 
Mean Self-Esteem Level for Each Condition 
Condition Subjects with High Subjects with Low 
Self-Esteem Self-Esteem 
Neither/Nor 6.28 (24)* 5.10 (16) 
Attack-Only 6.47 (19) 5.12 (21) 
Supportive 6.19 (21) 5.02 (19) 
Refutational-Same 6.24 (18) 4.96 (22) 
Refutational-Different 6.16 ( 18) 4.99 ( 2 2) 
*Indicates number of subjects per cell 
In order to exam~ne the immunizing effects of the 
three types of defenses on subsequent attacks, it was 
necessary that these attacks significantly reduce initial 
belief levels. If an attack were ·Unsuccessful, the value 
of a defense would be questionable. Table 5 contains an 
analysis of variance of the neither-nor/attack-only data 
from Table 2 in a 2 x 2 design. 
TABLE 5 
Analysis of Variance of Attack-Only and 







df MS F 
1 2. 52. 0.29 
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p 
Attack (B) 299.84 1 299.84 34.07 <. 01 
A X B 16.31 1 16.31 1.85 
Within Cell 669.11 76 8.80 
F.99 (1-76) = 7.08 
The main effect of the attack factor (Table 5) compares 
the initial belief level (ne~ther/nor) and the attack-
only conditions. Individual t tests performed between t e 
neither/nor and attack-only means with each level of se f-
esteem produced t ratios significant at the p ~ .01 leve 
for both high self-esteem groups and low self-esteem 
groups. The interaction between self-esteem level and 
attack factors was non-significant. In summary, the 
significantly reduced initial belief levels for both 
esteem levels. 
Analysis of var1ance was also used to exarn1ne , 
effects of level of self-esteem, ~ype defense, an 
action in a 3 x 2 design. The results are re 
Table 6. 
TABLE 6 
Main and Interaction Eff ct 
Treatments Involving a Defe s a. 
Source of 
· Variation 




A X B 
"/ i thin Cell 
F.95 (1-114) 
F.95 (2 - 114) 
The results 
















1. Vfu at is the relat;io s ; i e 
persuasion and genera~ se- f -es~~·~u~ 
Analysis of var1ance co 
u we igh ted-means wit ne a ce 1 f 
reve al a significant· F ratio e 
s upport previo s repor·s of a 
be tween se f-estee and ers as 
t at interactions did ot occur as a 
es tee and de fe s e type. 
2.. \ at type of defe se s 
estee indi id a s ~ 
pers asion for 
o exam1ne t ese es l. 
1 o ~ g co ar1so 
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test was selected as the appropriate statistical me t o 
The more stringent two-tailed tests were employed s i ce 
direction predictions were involved. 
Altho~gh there appeared to be no significant linea 
relationship, there is some evidence that the refutatio a -
same seems to be the best suited defense for low se f -
esteem subjects. Table 3 illustrates that the refuta-4-io a-
same (8.57) is also higher (p <.10, t test) than t h e 
corresponding neither/nor . (6.92) conditi.on. 1'1hile t e 
refutational-same defense (8 .·s 7) did not produce a s1g :1 -
ficantly higher mean belief level than the refutation a -
different (8.14), it did approach significance (p<.l 
t test) in relation to the mean belief level produced b 
the supportive defense (6.88). 
All three defenses ~reduced a significant y ( < 
t test) h~gher mean level of belief than the corres 
attack-only (3.90) condition. Thus, for the o 4 s e £ -
esteem subjects all three defense types produce 
to persuasion accordini to the operational defi 
resistance. 
3. What type of defense is best suite f r g se 
esteem individuals for moderately , e e 1.. ! 
The supportive ~efense (7.92) appears to 
suited defense condition for high self-estee 
(see Table 3). The supportive defense ( 7.9~ 
a significantly higher ( .15 /p > .. 10, t test: 
belief than the correspond1ng refutationa -s ] 
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refutational-different (7.15). All three defenses produced 
a significantly higher (p< .01, t test) mean level of belief 
than the corresponding attack-only (3.36) condition. Thus, 
as with low self~esteem subjects, resistance to per-
suasion was produced by all the defense types for the high 
self-esteem subjects. 
4. Of supportive, refutational-same, and refutational-
different, which defense is .best suited . for all 
subjects combined for moderately held beliefs? 
The highest grand mean level of belief .was produced 
by the mean of the refutational-same defenses (7.87). This 
mean level of belief is higher than the grand mean for all 
six defensive conditions combined (7.67). · Refutational-
different and supportiye defenses grand mean belief levels 
were 7.65 and 7.40 respectively. All defense . grand mean 
belief levels were significantly (p<.Ol, t test) higher 
than the corresponding . grand mean belief level for the 
attack-only (3.63) condition . . 
Although the refutational-same defense appears to be 
the best suited for all self-esteem levels, it is essential 
to reiterate that, even though it is the best defense 
condition for low self-esteem subjects, it is not as 
effective as the supportive defense for high self-est~em 
subjects. Thus, when levels of self-esteem are combined, 
there appears to be little or no difference 1n the 
resistance-conferri~g efficacy between defense types. 
Discussion 
Discussion of the results is accomplished by treating 
each research - question separately. 
1. What is the relationship between resistance to 
persuasion and general self-esteem? 
In contrast to Janis (1959), level of self-esteem was 
not a reliable predictor of persuasibility. According to 
previous studies, it would be predicted that low self-
esteem subjects would score lower in the attack-only 
condition than the high self-esteem subjects. This is 
based upon the often cited theory that self-esteem and 
persuasibility form an inverse relationship. Yet, in this 
study the low self-esteem subjects scored higher (3.90) 
than the high self-esteem subjects (3.36). Though the 
difference between these figures did not reach statistical 
significance, they not only do not replicate previous 
research, but also appear to reveal a reverse trend. 
Further support for such a trend is seen in the comparative 
belief level depreciation from the neither-nor to the 
attack-only treatments for the two levels of self-esteem. 
While high self-esteem subjects dropped from 8.20 to 3.36, 
a drop of 4.84, low self-esteem subjects decreased from 
6.92 to 3.90, a drop of only 3.02 (see Table 3). 
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In the current study, any prior defense was significantly 
(p <.OS, t test) advantageous in maintaining the initial 
belief level for all subjects. Inoculation theory would 
predict that t .he -refutational defenses would produce more 
resistance than the supportive defense. However, for high 
self-esteem subjects, supportive (7.92) appeared to repre-
sent the best defense, though it was not significantly. 
(.lO<p<.lS, t test) superior to the refutational-same 
. . 
(7.17) or refutational-differ·ent ·. (7..15) defenses. · This 
deviant result may be directly attributed to the use of 
moderate beliefs used in this study in comparison with . 
McGuire's use of cultural truisms. McGuire (196la, p. 332) 
recognized the limitation of cultural truisms: 
Had the beliefs been controversial rather than 
truisms, the subject~ would have been more practiced 
in defending them, and, hence, would have participated 
more effectively in the active defense conditions and 
would have been less in need of a threatening defense 
stimulating pre-exposure. Had the issues been less 
involving than these health ones, there would have 
been more to gain, in regard to motivating the . 
subject to pay adequate attention to the material 
from requiring his active participation in ~he 
defense. Hence, with different types of issues we 
would expect resulting differences not only in the 
size of the obtained results, but even in the 
directions. 
Pryor (1972) reasoned that subjects should already 
possess a level of awareness regarding the vulnerabilities 
of their middle-range beliefs, and would therefore be able 
to conjure arguments in its defense. Pryor (1972) predicted 
that the supportive defense would confer a significant 
amount of resistance to attack for moderately held beliefs. 
Although he obtained only m1nor support, the supportive 
defense did reduce the effects of the attack to a non-
signifjcant level. 
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Braden (1962) reported that the refutational was not 
super1or to the · - ~upportive defense in inducing resistance. 
However, Pryor (1972) stated ~hat Braden's repiication of 
McGuire's procedures was not precise and that such method-
ological differences may have led to her variant findings 
on the supportive defense. 
The superiority of the supportive defense for high 
self-esteem subjects 1s reported by Cohen (1959) when he 
asserted that subjects of high self-esteem appeared to be 
less respons1ve to outside influence and were characterized 
by a preference for defenses which help · them ignore chal-
lenging defenses and conflicti~g communication. Cohen (1959) 
also reported that subjects with low self-esteem show a 
preference for more expressive and challengi~g defenses. 
Further support for this ·reasoning was reported by Leven-
thal and Perloe (1962), . ~hen they stated that high self-
esteem subjects tended to change more towards optimistic 
(supportive, 7.92) communications than pessimistic 
(refutational-same, 7.17; refutational-different, 7.15) ones, 
while low esteem subje·cts showed the opposite tendencies for 
optimistic (supportive, 6.88) communications and pessimistic 
(refutational-same, 8.57; refutational-different, 8.14) 
communications. It seems logical to postulate that the 
supportive defense, which contains only belief-supporting 
information, 1s more optimistic than the refutational defenses . 
This study suggests that there is not a positive 
linear relationship between resistance to persuasion and 
self-esteem. To the extent that resistance to persuasion 
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is the mirr0r image of persuasibility, the results contradict 
the common notion- of an inverse linear relationship between 
persuasibility and self-esteem. 
Gollob and Dittes (1965) reasoned that the findings 
of increased p~rsuasibility for those with lower self-
esteem probably depended on specific characteristics of the 
communication. By varying crucial aspects of the communlca-
tion, such as threat and message complexity, they predicted 
varying relationships between self-esteem and persuasibility. 
Cox and Bauer (1964) suggested that the linear relationship 
previously reported among male subjects required modifi-
cation. The results of their study showed that under some 
conditions subjects with very low self-esteem actually 
became counter-persuasible. Gollob and Dittes (1965) also 
reported that their resu~ts provided little illumination 
concerning comparisons between persuasibility and self-
esteem. Measures of self-esteem were not significantly re-
lated to any of the opinion measures. Finally, their 
"results emphasize that self-esteem may affect persuasibility 
through differential '.learning' of the communication as 
well as through the more commonly considered process of 
the 'acceptance' of the communication (p. 200)." 
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2. What type of defense is best suited for low self-
esteem individuals to accomplish resistance to 
persuasion for moderately held beliefs? 
According to the definition of ~esistance used by 
McGuire and also in this study, resistance occurs when a 
defense-attack condition produces a mean belief level 
significantly higher than its corresponding attack-only 
treatment. In this sense, resistance occurred under all 
defense conditions for 1 subjects of low self-esteem. 
As mentioned previous.ly, McGuire (1964) reported the 
superiority of the refutational form of defenses over 
supportive for cultural truisms. Pryor (1972) offers some 
support that the same may be true of moderately held beliefs. 
In the current study, although the corresponding mean belief 
levels for the refutational defenses are in the expected 
direction, significant differences were not observed among 
the three. 
It is interesting to note that, although all three 
defenses achieved significantly (p< .OS, t test) higher 
mean belief levels than their corresponding attack-only 
treatments, only refutational-same (8.57) and refutational-
different (8.14) produced mean belief levels higher than 
the corresponding neither/nor (6.92) condition. The dif-
ference between refutational-sarne and the neither/nor control 
approached significance (p <.10, t test) while the 
refutational-different (p< .30, t test) condition does not. 
The supportive condition (6.88) produced a slightly lower 
mean .lev . el .than the· neither/n.or. condition. Thus, of the 
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three defenses, a form of refutational defenses appears to 
be best suited for individuals of low self-esteem. These 
results are in line with the previous research reported above. 
Another p~s.~ible explanation for the results obtained 
from low self-esteem subjects occurs as a direct relation 
to their initial belief level. Since the low self-esteem 
neither/nor condition was below 7.0 (6.92), subjects 
actually scored in the "~lightly disagree" cat~gory. Pryor 
(1972) speculated that "de.fenses which attempt to increase 
the level of belief on topics which rank low in initial 
belief level may be viewed as counter-attitudinal in nature 
(p. 25)." Thus, the defenses for low self-esteem could 
probably be defined as counter-attitudinal. Unlike cultural 
truisms, subjects were probably not motivated to defend 
these beliefs as a result . of threatening mention of argu-
ments, such as conferred by the refutational defenses. It 
is possible that motivation could be derived as a result 
of a weak form of diss~nance caused by reading the slightly 
counter-attitudinal defenses. Researchers have reported 
that when insufficient rewards or punishments are given for 
engaging in counter-attitudinal acts, dissonance may be 
reduced by attitude change in the direction advocated in 
the counter-attitudinal message (Aronson and Carlsmith, 
1963; Cohen and Brehm, 1962; Freedman, 1965; and Nuttin, 
196 6) . 
Counter-attitudinal advocacy may have caused attitude 
change in the direction of advocation due to the subject's 
inability to justify or rationalize his participat~ 
counter-attitudinal act. This may partially exvlai t 
finding that - for low self-esteem subjects, two oft 
defense types (refutational-same and refutational -d 
produced mean belief levels appreciably higher t han 
initial control belief level. 
3. What type of d'efense is best suited for ig s 
esteem individuals for moderately held b e l ,· fs .. 
Resistance to persuasion also occurred under al . 
defense conditions (p<.Ol~ t tests) for subjects f 
self-esteem. However, unlike the low self-estee 
the high self-esteem subjects seemed to benefit mo 
the supportive defense condition (7.92) as oppos e 
refutational-same (7.17) or .refutational-differe t 
defense conditions. Although the correspond1ng e · 
levels did not occur as Mc.Guire might have sus 
Table 3), statistically significant (.15>p/ 
differences were not observed among the three 
It is also conceivable that moderately e 
as defined in this current study and by Pryor · ( 
are more ego-involving than the cultural t 
McGuire (1964). It is suggested that more e 
topics may have motivated subjects to defe 
beliefs, thus rendering the supportive defe 
more effectiv.e. This reasoning is in li e 
reported by Pryor (1972). 
Another princ~pal difference is o~e , 
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between the mean belief level of the neither/nor condition 
and the mean belief levels of the three defens e - conditions. 
Whereas, the two refutational defenses for low self-
esteem subject~ _produced mean belief levels high e r than the 
corresponding neither/nor condition, none of t h e defe nse 
conditions for subjects with high self-esteem ( s upportive 
7.92, refutational-same 7.17 and refutational-different 
7.15) attained or exceeded the mean belief lev e l in the 
neither/nor condition (8.20). There does not a ppear to be 
a defense which is clearly a best suited condition for high 
self-esteem subjects. 
4. Of supportive, refutational-same, an d r efutational-
different, which defense is the best s uited for 
all subjects combin~4 for moderately h e ld beliefs? 
McGuire's research has repeatedly demonstrated.that 
the refutational-same defense condition rank s as the most 
effective immunizer, followed by the refutati on a l - different 
and supportive defense conditions in that order . Combining 
the six means produced by all defense conditions i n this 
study, a grand defense mean of 7.67 is obtained . The grand 
mean produced by the · refutational-same conditions is 7.87. 
The corresponding grand mean for the refutat i onal-different 
defenses is 7.65, and for the supportive defen s e s it is 
7.40. The refutational-same defense has t h e only grand 
mean . greater than the overall grand mean. Thus ; these 
grand means produced mean belief levels which are 1n the 
same order the inoculation theory would pre d ict. In 
--
addition, Pryor (1972) reports the identical trend occurs 
for initially low and moderately-held beliefs . . 
In light of McGuire's (1964), Pryor's (1972) and the 
current study, it seems reasonable to conclude that the 
practitioner is best advised to employ the refut~tional­
same defense technique as a belief-maintaining device. 
This defense appears to be . the most successful if self-
esteem is unknown, as is usually the case. 
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A large within cell variance of meart belief levels may 
have contributed to some of the non-significant results. 
A possible reason for this ~arge variance is that several 
of the test booklets were returned with the appearance 
of deliberate mismarki~gs and a few profane remarks. ' 
However, a separate a~alysis of variance was accomplished, 
deleti~g those particular - booklets, and the results did 
not differ from thQse reported. Another plausible expla-
nation for the large variance of scores is the wide range 
of intell~gence, income, age, and sociometric status of 
·the subjects examined in the current study. However, this 
is not a plausible basis for assuming that the same results 
would not occur under similar conditions if replicated. 
Perhaps certain departures from the McGuire procedures 
contribute to the lack of significant differences between 
defense types. The current experiment employed independent 
control groups for comparison with experimental group data. 
McGuire (1964) rotated subjects around treatments, with 
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each subject supplying either experimental or control data 
on all issues. While McGuire employed anywhere from 24 to 
80 subjects per cell in his experiments, the current study 
used approximatelr 20 subjects per cell. It is possible 
that a ~arger sample would have produced results eve~ more 
consistent with inoculation theory since with a larger 
sample a small difference 1s more likely to show up as 
significant. 
Finally, it is perhaps unreasonable to expect a trait 
o f personality to correlate with persuasibility to such a 
high degree that the individual would respond with agreement 
to any statement on any topic emanating from any source. 
For example, regardless of differences in personality 
traits, strong presstire may move everyone in the direction 
of intended influence. On the other hand, if the pressure 
i s weak, and explicit demands are not made on the individual, 
then relevant personali~y traits might produce greater 
differences in observed behavior. 
This study obviously needs replication with attention 
paid to such potentially relevant variables as ego~ 
involvement, controversial beliefs, and message intensity. 
The present study is .no exception to the rule that research 
generates more questions than it answers. 
Summary 
The purpose of this investigation was to determine the 
relationship between resistance to persuasion and generalized 
self-esteem. Resistance was studied as a function of pre-
treatments which, when administered to a receiver, would 
render him less susceptible t6 persuasive messages than 
he was found to be without these pretreatments. The 
research design followed the McGuire inoculation theory 
paradigm, except that moderately-held beliefs were used 
instead of cultural truisms as topics. 
In order to examine this phenomenon, an experimental 
group (3 x 2 design) and a control group (2 x 2) was 
employed. The experimental group was divided into high and 
low self-esteem groups, via median split of self-esteem 
scores, with each subject randomly receiving one of the 
three defensive conditicns: refutational-same, refutational-
different or supportive. The control group, also divided 
into high and low self-esteem groups, received an attack-
only or a neither defense, nor attack condition. 
Analysis of variance did not reveal a significant~F 
ratio for main and interaction effects. Hence, the data 
did not support previous reports of an inverse linear 
relationship between self-esteem and persuasibility. 
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There was some evidence that the refutational-same 
defensive condition was the best suited defense . for low 
self-esteem subjects, while the supportive defensive con-
dition appeared superior for high self-esteem subjects. 
---
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Although . the refutational-same defense appears to b~ the 
superior defense for all subjects combin~d, there does not 
appear to be a significant difference in the resistance-
conferring efficacy between defense types for moderately-
held beliefs. 
The relationship between resistance to persuasion and 
generalized self-esteem seems to support Cohen's (1959) 
interaction hypothesis, rather .than a generalized form of 
the simpler hypothesis of an ·inverse linear relationship 
between esteem and pe~suasibility reported by Janis 
(1954) and Janis & Field {1959), and Janis and Rife (1959). 
Cohen (1959) proposed that other personality factors 
_interact with self-esteem to produce communication outcomes. 
This study does not demonstrate a generalized relationship 
between self-esteem and persuasibility. 
We should avoid . generalization based on the data 
reported in this study until future replication by other 
researchers. Many statistically insignificant trends were 
obtained, including statistically insignificant reversals 
from predicted associations. 
The results are consistent with the theory that those 
of high and low self-e~teem have different defensive 
orientation (Hovland and Janis, 1966). These researchers 
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speculated that high self-esteem subjects tend to ~gnore 
or avoid confrontations, while low self-esteem subjects are 
more likely to be receptive to anxiety-provoking messages. 
The fact that t~~ _ supportive defenses produced the highest 
l 
mean belief level for the high self-esteem subjects and 
the lowest for the low self-esteem subjects is in line with 
this reasoning. 
The results of this .study indicate that differences 
1n self-esteem are associated with considerable differences 
1n an individual's responses to external pressures. Self-
esteem seems to mediate stimulus and response much the same 
as a lens m~ght mediate the perception of an object. 
Additional research is needed to determine that if 1n a 
mass persuasion situation, once opinion ch~ge has occurred 
and new .information or petsuasion has been accepted, 
regress1on over a period of time and under the pressure of 





Below 1s a ser1es of statements. Indicate how you 
feel about each by circling the appropriate numbers. For 
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example, number 1 indicates very strong agreement with the 
statement, number 4 indicates neutral feelings, and number 7 
indicates very strong disagreement. 
DISAGREE 
1. I feel that I am a person of worth, 
at least on an equal plane with 
others . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 . I am an attractive person . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3 . I feel that I have a number of good 
qualities . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I like to look n1ce and neat all 
the time . . . . .. .. . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5 . All ln all, I am inclined to feel 
that I am a failure . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6 • I have a lot of self-control . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7 • I am able to do things as well as 
most other people . • . . • 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8 . I am popular with women . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9 • I feel I do not have much to be 
proud of . . . . . . . . 1 z 3 4 5 6 7 
10. I like my looks just the way 
they are . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. I take a positive attitude toward 
myself . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 z 3 4 5 6 7 . . . 
12. I would like to cha~g~ some parts 
of my body . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Z 3 4 5 6 7 
13. On the whole, I am satisfied with 
myself . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Z 3 4 5 6 7 
14. I am not the person I would like 
to be . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
15. I wish I could have more respect 
for myself . . .. • . . . . . . . . . . 
16. I try to change when I know I'm 
doing things that are wro~g . • 




I can always take care of myself 
1. n any s it u at i on . . . . · . . . . . 
At times I think I am no good 
at all . . . . . . . . . . . 
I find it hard to · talk. with 







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
APPENDIX B 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(Supportive Defense: Medium-Range Belief) 
Vehicular Defects: A Frequent Cause of Traffic Accidents 
. Research on_traffic safety has received vastly 
1ncreased attent1on over the past two decades. Previous 
to 1950, little _ ~as known about accident causation. How-
ever, the ~ve~ incre~sing annual highway accident figures 
have made 1t 1mperat1ve that both government agencies and 
private industry work toward a solution to the traffic 
accident problem. Research programs, funded largely by 
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) 
and the auto manufacturers, were initiated .with the belief 
that traffic safety could best be improved by the applica-
tion of scientific and quantitative methods, both to the 
study of the accident problem, and to the study of remedies 
for it. The findings of the past twenty years cite many 
causes for the traffic accident problem. A highly fre- . 
quent contributor has proven to be vehicular malfunctions. 
Each day thousands of automobiles are mass produced on 
Detroit assembly lines and scattered to dealerships across 
thB country. An alarmingly high percentage of these cars 
leave the factories with at least one defective part. 
Unfortunately, this is only the beginning of the problem. 
Few car owners take a preventive approach to automobile 
~aintenance. Instead, they wait until they are without 
transportation, due· to a damaged or worn out part, to 
visit the repair garage. 
It is the rare car buyer who is not forced to return 
to the dealership within weeks of his purchase for adjust-
ments or repairs on his shiny new machine. Since most 
people are still envelop~ d with pride over the looks and 
performance of the new car, the inconvenience caused by 
this early visit to the · service department is quickly 
forgotten. On the other hand, individuals who have been 
caused more than inconvenience are less likely to forget. 
The highest percentage of unit defects in mass produced 
automobiles occurs with cars built on Mondays and Fridays, 
when partying and drinking practices affect the highest 
number of both blue and white collar workers. Recent 
studies involving examinations of late model cars involved 
in fatal accidents, have indicated that many crashes 
heretofore attributed to careless or reckless driving, may 
have been caused by vehicular defects such as brake failure, 
a loose steering rod bolt, etc. Arthur Little's recent 
book entitled The State .of The Art of Traffi~ Safet~ 
reports that "In sp1te of the 1nCiustry 1 s effort, de ective 
vehicles are produced and sold. He noted further_ th~t all 
32 cars tested by NHTSA in 1968, showed trouble w1th1n the 
first 5,000 miles of driving." 
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The best method of preventing accidents caused by 
vehicular defects is by replacing old or badly worn parts. 
Unfortuantely, such a preventive approach to highway 
safety is seldom taken in today's world of high repair 
costs and limited time available to properly maintain an 
automobile. For most Americans, it is time to bring the 
car to a repair shop only when it has stopped running. 
Mosely (1963) studJ.ed in detail over one-hundred fatal 
accidents in the Boston area and concluded that "many 
'accidents' are due to vehicular failures." He pointed to 
accidents in which cars were improperly repaired and others 
in which the lack of preventive maintenance was instrumental. 
Typically, Americans drive with brakes which have lost 
SO% of their efficiency. In 1969, the State of Illinois 
asked dealers and garages. to inspect the brake systems on 
cars brought in for other ~ork. Out of 494 vehicles 
inspected, 336 (68%) showed at least one brake defect. 
Since defects of some sort are to be expected in any mass-
produced item on a statistical basis, and since individual 
parts of any machine do wear out with use, preventive 
maintenance is a necessary practice if we are to decrease 
the high number of traffic accidents caused by vehicular 
malfunctions. · 
so 
(Refutational Defense: Medium-Range Belief) 
Vehicular Defects: A Frequent Cause of .Traffic Accidents 
Over the past two decades traffic safety research 
programs, funded largely by government agencies such as 
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) 
and by the ·automobile industry, have made great progress 
in the study of accident causation. The findings of the 
past twenty years have done much to clarify the relative 
roles of human and vehicular factors in traffic accidents. 
As a result of this research, it is now known that vehicu-
lar factors are a highly frequent contributor to traffic 
accidents. Unfortunately, there have been occasional 
articles in the press whi~h argue that v~hicular defects 
do not play a major role in the traffic accident problem. 
Before our ever increasing traffic ~roblems can begin to 
be solved, it is necessary that the American public be 
informed of what research ·scientists have learned about 
accident causation. Thus, it is important to review 
misleading and distorted information. It has been claimed, 
for example, that "human factors," driving while under the 
influence of alcohol and dri~ing too fast, are the primary 
causes of traffic accidents. Some critics have cited the 
low number of vehicular causes of traffic accidents 
reported in police department annual statistical summaries. 
Let us examine the fallacies inherent in each of these 
arguments. 
To argue that drunk driving and excessive speed are 
the primary causes of accidents is to ignore the body of 
research findings gathered in controlled studies of 
accidents. These investigations show unequivocally that 
drunk driving and spee4ing are responsible for on1y a 
small percentage of traffic accidents. For example, 
Borkenstein (1968) studied 5,987 accidents on Michigan 
roadways and concluded that only 3.2 percent of the_drivers 
had blood alcohol concentrations equal to or exceed1ng the 
legal limit. Speeding was cited as a causal factor in an 
even smaller percentage of these accidents. Further, the 
assertion that humans are to blame for accidents by no 
means conflicts with the "human factor" theory. Vehicular 
defects are caused by · humans who build cars, and are 
caused and perpetuated by humans who fail to proper~y 
maintain their cars. While it is important to real1ze 
that many factors contribute to the total ~raffic a~cident 
problem, we cannot afford to ignore the_ev1dence wh1ch 
points to vehicular malfunctions as a h1ghly frequent 
contributor to highway crashes. 
Another example of a misleading argument against 
recent findings is that police department annual statis-
tical summaries do not show a high incidence o·f vehicular 
failures in traffic accidents. This is certainly not a 
surprising finding since police officers who are called 
to the scene of an accident are neither mechanics, nor 
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are they require~ to inspect the individual parts of the 
cars. The·ir p·r1.mary purposes are to attend to the injured, 
clear the roadway, restore normal traffic flow, and file 
a concise report of the participation of each driver and 
passenger involved in the accident. Reporting of vehicular 
defects is done only when such defects are obvious, such 
as blown-out tires. Since in most cases the assignment 
of fault determines financial responsibility for damage 
and injury~ police officers are often reluctant to label 
even obvious vehicle defects as causal unless they have 
personally witnessed the accident. When police officers 
do report vehicular defects, it is usually within the 
context of the testimony _of a driver, passenger, or 
witness. Thus, in the vast majority of accidents, no 
attempt is made to check for vehicular causes. It is 
not, therefore, surprising that police summaries fail to 




(Attack-Same: Medium-Range Belief} 
The Automobile: An Infrequent Cause of Traffic Accidents 
In light of ~~ch controversy regarding the causes of 
o~r increasing tiaffic accident problem, iecent ihvestiga-
tlons ha~e attempted to plac~ the various contributing 
f a ctors 1nto proper perspect1ve. To the surprise of few 
researchers, the factors of driving while under the influence 
of alcohol and excessive speed ha~e proven to be the two 
most frequent contributors to traffic accidents. Despite 
the assertions of some independent research groups 
vehictilar factors do not · appear to be a frequent c~use 
of accidents. This can be seen in the low percentage of 
vehicular failures cited in national summaries of police 
dep a rtment statistics on accident causation. Because it 
i s important that everyon~ who drives a motor vehicle 
understands the causes of our growing traffic safety pro-
blem, it is useful to examine in detail the evidence which 
has l~d professional researchers to isolate human factors, 
driving under the influence of alcohol, and speeding, as 
the most common contributors.to traffic crashes. 
For several years·, professional researchers have 
the orized that the ariver~ the human factor, is the primary 
s ource o f our traffic ac~ident problem. The U. S. Depart-
me n t of Transportation (DOT) and the automobile industry 
h ave responded to the need for research funds necessary 
t o e xplore the role of human factors in traffic crashes. 
In 1969, DOT appropriated over 100 million dollars to 
f inance alcohol safety ~ction programs in 40 U. S. cities. 
The projects were designed in part to define the role of 
alcohol in traffic crashes. By early 1970, initial results 
began to accumulate in Washington. National aver~ge~ 
indicated that in approximately 55% of all fatal acc1dents, 
at least one of the drivers had· a measurable blood alcohol 
content. The smallest ratio of alcohol involvement was 
reported in Denver, Colorado, where 34% of the crashes 
showed at least one driver who had been drinking. While 
statistics involving non-fatal crashes were not quite as 
high, they left no do.ubt that alcohol is a primary con-. 
tributing factor to our traffic accident probl~m. Rank1ng 
a close second is another human factor, excess1ve speed. 
As in the case of alcohol, the more serious the accident, 
the greater the · likelihood that speeding was a contributor. 
Together, the human factors of alcohol and speeding account 
for the majority of traffic crashes. 
A second source of da~a which serves to c+arify the 
role of vehicular malfunct1ons in accident causation is 
the annual nationwide summary of accident statistics 
compiled by individual · police departments and published 
by the National Safety Council. In 1970, less than 3% 
of all reported a~~idents were found related to vehicular 
defects. Further, the Na~ional Safety Council asked 
officers in 144 police departments across the country to 
complete a short questionnaire on each accident. The 
questionnaire asked for the officer's opinion of the 
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causes of the accident. The data were collected 1n a 
completely anonymous manner, identifying neither the acci-
de nt participants nor the officer, thus removing the threat 
o f use of the information as court evidence by one of the 
i nvolved parties. Since the police officers could thereby 
f reely evaluate and report all possible causes, it is 
significant that results showed only a statistically 
·trivial increase over the national average in the percentage 
o f accidents attributed to vehicular failure. These and 
other recently ·recorded data provide convincing evidence 
t h at vehicular malfunctions play an insignificant role in 
our traffic ~ccident problem. 
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(Attack-Different: Medium-Range Belief) 
The Automobile: An Infrequent Cause of Traffic Accidents 
In light of m~ch controversy regarding the causes of 
o~r increasing tr~ffic accident problem, recent investiga-
tlons have attempted to place the various contributing 
factors into proper perspective. To the surprise of few 
researchers, the factor of "driver inattention," lack of 
alertness, has proven to be the most frequent contributor 
to traffic crashes. Research findings have isolated 
another factor, hazardous roads, as the second most fre-
quent contributor to automobile accidents. Despite the 
assertions of some independent research groups, vehicular 
factors do not appear to be a frequent cause of traffic 
accidents. Because it is important that everyone who 
drives a motor vehicle understands the causes of our 
growing traffic accident problem, it is necessary to 
examine in detail the evidence which has led professional 
resea·rchers to isolate "driver inattention" and hazardous 
road conditions as the most common contributors to traffic 
crashes. 
For several years, professional researchers have 
theorized that the driver, the human factor, is the primary 
source of our traffic ac~ident problem. The U. S. Depart-
ment of Transportation (DOT) and the automobile industry 
have responded to the need for research funds to explore 
the role of human factors in traffic crashes . . In 1969, 
DOT appropriated over 100 million dollars to finance post-
accident investigations .of several hundred accidents in 
each of 40 U. S. cities. As part of each investigation, 
an interview questionnaire was administered to drivers. 
These drivers were asked to assess the degree to which 
vehicular, human, road, and other environmental factors 
contributed to their accident. The results isolated a 
factor which was labeled "driver inattention" as a con-
tributing factor in 55% of the total accidents. Reasons 
given for inattention were varied, ranging from physical 
fatigue, to reprimanding a child in the back seat, to 
"daydreaming." DOT c.oncluded that Americans take the 
driving task very much for granted; so much so that_t~ey 
seldom devote it complete attention under normal dr1v1ng 
conditions. 
Another important findi~g ?f. the ~OT stud~ rega~ds 
the role of hazardous road cond1 t1ons ·1n ·trafflc acc1dents. 
Hazardous .roads were found to be the second most frequent 
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contributor to crashes. Arthur Little, writing recently 
in· The· ·st·a·te· ·o'f ·the ·A·r ·t ·o·f Tr·a·f .fi ·c ·s·a·fe.ty s_ummarized his 
review of related research by stating that "Information 
available on the various aspects of the roadway itself is 
extensive and has been well documented over a considerable 
number of years. Factors which emerge as particularly 
important are the -~i~blems associated with skidding and 
nighttime driving." Mills and Shelton (1968) studied high-
way accidents in Virginia and found that 40% of all reported 
accidents over a one-year period involved skidding. Sig-
n i ficantly, in one-thiid of these accidents, the skidding 
occurred before brake application. Such controlled 
investigations have clearly established hazardous road 
conditions as a frequent ·contributor to traffic accidents. 
Further, these and other recently recorded data provide 
convincing evidence that vehicular malfunctions play an 
ins~gnificant ·role in our traffic .accident problem. -
/ 
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(Filler Essay for Control Groups) 
The Benefits of Brushing Teeth after Every Meal 
Even though we all recognize the wisdom of brushing 
our teeth after e~~ry meal, this practice is so important 
that it is worthwhile to review some of tne reasons for 
carry~ng ?ut this va~uable bealth measure. Naturally, tooth 
brush1ng 1mproves ·the appearance of our teeth, something 
that is desirable in itself. More important, science has 
demonstrated many health benefits deriving from brushing 
our teeth. Tooth brushing has been found to be ·of importance 
even in combating other mouth diseases besides tooth decay . . 
And, by preventing these oral diseases, tooth brushing 
after every meal also reduces the complications in other 
parts of our body which are often the results of unchecked 
tooth decay. Because of the ·extreme importance of the 
practice, let us review briefly some of the reasons why 
brushing one's teeth after every meal is so necessary for 
the preservation of health. 
Besides reducing tooth decay, brushing the teeth 
after every meal has a~ditional health benefits. There are 
a number of other mouth diseases as unpleasant as tooth 
decay that are produced by mouth bacteria. These bacteria 
can, for example, cause diseases of the gums such as 
pyorrhea (or R~ggs' disease). These diseases are painful 
and unattractive themselves and unless quickly checked, 
can lead to loss of teeth . and other secondary complications. 
In addition, they have some unexpected side effects such 
as malnutrition, since t~e sufferer is unable to continue 
his normal solid diet while the conditions continue. 
Brushing the teeth also reduces the concentration of the 
bacteria that cause these diseases. (just as it reduces the 
concentration of the decay-causing bacteria) in three ways: 
?by mechanically dislodging the bacteria; by removing the 
food particles they need in order to grqw; and by the 
introduction of bacteria-killing chemicals in the tooth 
paste. Hence, frequent tooth brushing is important, not 
only for the prevention of tooth decay, but also as a 
guard against other mouth diseases. 
Not only does tooth brushing directly reduce to?th . 
decay and other mouth diseases, but by helping to ma1nta1n 
good oral hygiene it also aids in keeping other parts of 
the body healthy.~ Tooth decay, for exarn~le, i~ bas~cally 
a chronic infection, and like any other 1nfeot1on, 1t has 
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harmful effects not just on the directly affected areas, 
but also upon the body as a whole. Such chronic infections 
tend to lower the person's resistance to all diseases and 
often affect other specific organs. For example, we know 
that many cases of liver and kidney diseases as well as 
poor eyesight and even blindness, can be traced back to 
tooth decay. While tooth decay is not responsible for all 
kidney, liver arid- eye diseases, more of these diseases 
are due to chronic infection .from tooth de~ay than is 
generally recognized. Therefore, brushing the teeth after 
each meal not · only constitutes good oral hygiene, but it 
also makes for good general body health. 
(Filler Essay for Control Groups) 
The Benefits of Brushi~g Teeth after -Every Meal 
Even though we all rec~gn~ze the wisdom of brushitig 
our teeth after every meal, the practice is so important 
that it is worthwhile to review ·some of the· reasons for 
carrying out this valuable health measure. Naturally, 
tooth brushing improves· th~ appearance of our te~th · 
. ' someth1ng that is desirable ·in itself. More important, 
science has demonstrated many health benefits deriving 
from brushing our te~th. Tooth brushing provides th~ 
best means we have of eliminating decay-causing bacteria 
which can destroy both teeth and gums. Such decay-
preventing measures have become especially important 
nowadays when our cha~ging food habits . .. are tending to 
increase the likelihood of tooth decay. Let us look 
briefly into some of the reasons why brushing one's tee.th 
after every meal is so important. 
It has been known for a long time that the major 
cause of tooth decay (dental .caries) is a general class 
of oral bacteria which are commonly known as "decay 
bacteria." A certain ·amount of these bacteria which 
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attack and damage teeth and gums are found in the human 
mouth at all times. Brushing one's teeth tends to remove 
these bacteria both mechanically and chemically. Several 
dental schools in this country and abroad have conducted 
experiments in which they have measured the number of . 
bacteria present in the mouths of people who brushed the1r 
teeth after every meal and those who did not. It was 
found that approximately 78% of the decay bacteria we:re 
eliminated after each brushing. (Since the remaining 
bacteria multiply very rapidly between and during meals, 
it is important to brush one's teeth again after each 
meal.) It was also found that regular tooth brushing 
reduces the decay by as much as 70% below what it is with 
only occasional brushings. Thus, by killi~g these ~ecay 
bacteria brushing one's . teeth after every meal cons1derably 
redvces tooth decay. · 
While brushing one's teeth after every meal has 
always been a recommended health practice, it has ~ecome 
more important than ever today because of chang~s 1n our 
eating habits. In this country, we are now ea~1ng a 
richer diet than ever before. Each year, we f1nd a large 
increase in the per person consumption.of such food~ as 
fruit juices, soft drinks, cakes, cand1es, etc., wh1ch are 
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the very foods which are most likely to cause tooth decay. 
Furthermore, there is an increasing tendency to eat between 
meals: the coffee break, the coke break, the after-the-
movie soda, and the TV or bedtime snack are becoming more 
and more popular. This between-meal food intake notably 
increases the possibility of tooth decay. Hence, to 
counteract these dietary trends that threaten to make the 
tooth decay probiem· even greater than before, it has become 
increasingly important that we take the most effective 
counter-measure against decay, namely, brushing our teeth 
after every meal. 
APPENDIX E 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE SUBJECTS 
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(COVER PAGE FOR SKILLS BOOKLET) 
SKILLS BOOKLET 
On the following pages you will find short essays on 
several topics. These essays have been prepared by a 
research team at the Institute for Social Research, and 
are designed to test reading $kills. Please follow closely 
the instructions below. If you have a question, come to 
the front of the room and .ask it privately. Do not· ask 
it al·oud. - -- --
( 1 ) Do not turn this, or any, page until asked to do so. 
(2) When instructed, read the following page at a fairly 
rapid pace, underlining what you believe to be the 
crucial clause (or group of words) in each paragraph. 
You will be given 5 minutes to complete each page. 
When you ·finish ·a ·p·ag·e; stop ·and ·aw·ai t ·fu·r ·ther 
1nstruct1ons. 
(3) At no time should you turn back to a previous page. 
DO NOT TURN THIS PAGE UNTIL TOLD TO DO SO. 
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